Gubby Under Pressure

Cricket: The Game and the Players , Bradman then asked Umpire Borwick what Allen was doing and received the reply, ‘We take it he’s declared.’ Desperate to waste more valuable time, Bradman said he had not heard Allen actually declare the innings closed, so Borwick ran off the ground after Allen and returned, four minutes later, to confirm the declaration. Allen hoped that, with 35 minutes still to play before stumps, England bowlers could take advantage of the horrendous conditions and grab several Australian second innings wickets. That time had been carelessly reduced to just half an hour by Allen’s melodramatic closure of England’s innings and Cardus was not optimistic: ‘It seemed a grim belated joke, as well as strategy hopeful and embarrassed and enforced.’ It was, indeed, too late. Bradman turned his batting order upside down and sent in bowlers to open the innings with instructions to keep appealing against the fading light. O’Reilly went first ball, but fewer than three overs were bowled before the umpires ended play for the day. Bradman believed that Allen had the winning of the match in the palms of his hands and should have declared at 56 for 2 when there was still over an hour left for play. Bradman would have been compelled to send in at least some of his main batsmen, few of whom, including himself, could handle sticky wickets, and Australia could have been at least five wickets down by the end of play, even if the hour was reduced by bad light. Bradman wrote in the News of the World eighteen months later: ‘I was terrified that Gubby Allen would declare and send us in for an hour or so on that pig of a pitch. I was afraid to look towards the pavilion, lest I saw him waving a hand to call us in. But he waited - waited till nine of his men were out - and then the light was beginning to fail and rain was coming.’ The absence in Allen’s letters of any the reference to the dilemma he had faced that Saturday, suggests that he felt guilty for getting his vital declaration wrong. After nearly fifty years in which to ponder the various options open to him, Allen told Swanton he believed the real moment of decision was when England had reached 68 for 4 after the loss of Hammond, but basically he was beaten by the vagaries of the weather. His somewhat convoluted explanation was as follows: ‘The next day was a Sunday and the playing conditions allowed for the pitch to be rolled at the curator’s discretion at any time after the close of play including the Sabbath. It would thus probably be in perfect condition on the Monday. The moment of decision, whether to declare or not, came when with both Hammond and Leyland out we were 68 for four and there were about fifty minutes playing time remaining. The decision rested on the weather. The clouds were very low, threatening rain at any moment or a successful appeal against the light. If play is not going to be suspended, you declare: if it is, you “stay put”, hoping to reduce the arrears of 132 on the Monday. I got the decision wrong because I assessed the weather incorrectly.’ What Allen doesn’t say is that there were several of his team who definitely believed that the right time to declare was immediately after Hammond was out, preferring to risk changes in weather or light, and gamble on success. Wyatt wrote: ‘I thought the declaration should have come earlier and I told Allen so at the time.’ Swanton says that both Wyatt and Robins ‘advised an earlier declaration.’ But Wyatt and the others had less to lose than Allen and the disquiet created at Lord’s, when Allen took a huge risk and made the The cricket 51